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Abstract— The Secure Grip project1 focuses on the
development of a hand-grip pattern recognition sys-
tem, as part of the smart gun. Its target customer is
the police. To explore the authentication performance
of this system, we collected data from a group of police
officers, and made authentication simulations based on
a likelihood-ratio classifier. This smart gun system has
been proved to be useful in the authentication of the po-
lice officers. However, its authentication performance
needs some further improvement, especially when data
for training and testing were collected with some time
in between. We present and analyze the simulation re-
sults of the authentication experiment. Based on the
analyses, we propose some methods to improve the sys-
tem’s authentication performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In grip pattern recognition the main research question
is, whether the pressure pattern exerted while holding an
object can be used to reliably authenticate a person. The
Secure Grip project focuses on the development of a pro-
totype recognition system, as part of the smart gun, where
the grip-pattern recognition ensures that it can only be fired
by its rightful user. This application is intended for use by
the police, since carrying a gun in public brings consider-
able risks. In the US vital statistics show that about 8% of
the law-enforcement officers, who are killed in a shooting
incident, are shot by their own weapon [1].
The first prototype of this smart gun system (see Fig. 1)
was described in [2], in terms of its design, implementation
and evaluation. A collection of grip patterns was gathered
from a group of mostly untrained subjects with no expe-
riences in shooting. The simulation results indicated that
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the grip pattern contains sufficient information to use for
authentication. To explore the authentication performance
of the smart gun system when used by its target customer,
the police, we collected new data from a group of police
officers. With the new data we made authentication simu-
lations, by using the same algorithm as was used in [2].
Fig. 1. Prototype of the smart gun
This paper presents and analyzes the authentication per-
formance of the smart gun system, with the grip patterns
collected from the police officers. Section 2 describes the
authentication algorithm. The procedure of data collection
is reviewed in Section 3. Subsequently, Section 4 presents
and analyzes the simulation results of the authentication
experiment. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section
5.
II. AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM
The authentication algorithm is based on a likelihood-
ratio classifier for Gaussian probability densities. The
likelihood-ratio classifier has been proved to be optimal,
in terms of the expected overall error rates if the data has
a known probability density function [3], [4]. We assume
that both the overall data, and that of each individual sub-
ject, are Gaussian distributed. The pixel values of each
grip pattern image are aligned into a column vector, and
are used as the features in the algorithm. In our system the
feature space has the dimension of 1936, since each grip
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pattern was recorded as a 44 by 44 image.
In practice, the exact probability density function of nei-
ther the overall data, nor the data of each individual sub-
ject is known, and therefore needs to be estimated from
the training data. In total, four parameters need to be es-
timated. They are the mean vector of the overall data, the
mean vector and the covariance matrix of each individual
subject’s data, and the transformation matrix. In our case,
the number of training samples from each subject should
be much more than 1936. This is to prevent the estimated
covariance matrices from being singular, and to prevent the
classifier suffering from overtraining. Otherwise, the algo-
rithm would suffer from the so-called small-sample-size
problem. However, we can not make this large number of
measurements, since it would be rather impractical for the
user enrollment.
To solve the small-sample-size problem, we assume that
each subject has the same within-class covariance matrix.
Thus, this common covariance matrix can be estimated
more accurately, by using data from all the subjects. As
a further step to relieve the effect of the small-sample-size
problem, we reduce the dimension of the feature space.
Firstly, we apply a PCA (Principal Component Analysis)
to project the overall data to a subspace with the biggest
variances. In this new space, the directions contributing to
the authentication, are not more than the number of sub-
jects minus one. And, these directions have the smallest
variances of each individual subject’s data [3]. Accord-
ingly, a further dimension reduction is achieved, by apply-
ing a PCA to each individual subject’s data, and discarding
all the directions, except only 40 ones (41 subjects in total)
with the smallest variances.
III. DATA COLLECTION
We collected grip patterns from a group of 41 police of-
ficers, in three sequential sessions. The three sessions had
approximately one month and four months in between. All
subjects in the group participated in both the first and the
second session, with 25 grip pattern images recorded from
each. In the third session, however, data was collected
from 22 subjects from the same group; and each subject
contributed 50 grip pattern images.
In both the first and the second session, we asked each
subject to pick up the gun, aim it at an assumed target, hold
it still, say “ready” as a signal for us to record the image of
his hand-grip pattern (see Fig. 2), and then release the gun
after we finished recording. This whole procedure was re-
peated by the subject until enough data was collected from
him. We observed afterwards, that most of the subjects’
hand-grip pattern, varied greatly on average from one ses-
sion to the other.
Fig. 2. An example of the hand-grip pattern image
To reduce this type of variation, in the third session, we
sounded a beep each time that we finished recording one
image. This was to rule out the inaccuracies in the data,
caused by the possibility that the subject released the gun,
before his hand-grip pattern was recorded. In addition, for
each subject, each time when he picked up the gun, we
started recording his grip patterns until he released the gun.
This type of movie-like recording is for further study of
the grip patterns’ characteristics in the future. Apart from
these, the data was collected in exactly the same way as in
the previous two sessions.
IV. EXPERIMENT, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, simulation results of the authentication
experiment are presented. Subsequently, these results are
analyzed from both the view point of the data character-
istics and that of the algorithm limitations. Given these
analyses, some methods are proposed to improve the au-
thentication performance of the system.
A. Experiment set-up and results
We made two types of simulations in order to evalu-
ate the authentication performance. One was the within-
session simulation, where data for both training and test-
ing came from the same session; the other was the across-
session simulation, where data collected in two different
sessions was used for training and testing, respectively.
The authentication performance was assessed by the over-
all Equal-Error Rate (EER) of all the subjects. This was
calculated by taking into account all the likelihood-ratios,
of both the genuine subjects and the impostors. In the
within-session case, we averaged the overall EERs ob-
tained from 20 runs of simulation as the final result. In
each single run, 75% of the data was randomly chosen for
training, and thus the rest 25% for testing. The simula-
tion results are presented in Table I and Table II. For easy
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comparison, the simulation result by using data collected
from the untrained subjects, is also presented in Table I, as
Session 0.
Session EER(%)
0 1.41
1 0.63
2 1.01
3 0.38
TABLE I
WITHIN-SESSION SIMULATION RESULTS
Training session Testing session EER(%)
1 2 8.78
2 1 7.02
1 3 23.18
3 1 15.82
2 3 19.36
3 2 19.09
TABLE II
ACROSS-SESSION SIMULATION RESULTS
One can see that when data for training and testing
came both from the same session, the reference algorithm
worked fairly well, and gave fewer authentication errors,
compared to the case where data collected from the un-
trained subjects was used; while the same algorithm shows
relatively worse results, when data collected in two differ-
ent sessions was used for training and testing, respectively.
Also, we found out that, both the false reject rate (FRR)
and the false acceptance rate (FAR) became bigger in the
across-session simulation, in comparison with their coun-
terparts in the within-session simulation. Besides, the FRR
increased more than the FAR. To give an example, we take
the first and the second session for training and testing, re-
spectively, and present these four curves in Fig.3.
A police gun must have a very low FRR, to make it
highly unlikely, that the rightful user could not able to fire
it. The current official requirement in The Netherlands,
for example, is that the FRR of a police gun must be lower
than 0.01%. Under this condition, the FAR should be as
low as possible. One can see from Fig.3, that in the within-
session simulation, the FAR is expected to be less than
10%, when FRR equals 0.01%. However, the FAR is more
than 90% under the same condition, in the across-session
simulation.
Since in practice, there will always be a time interval
between the user enrolment and the live authentication, the
Fig. 3. FAR and FRR curves obtained from the within-session
and the across-session simulation
across-session simulation results make more sense. To im-
prove the across-session authentication performance, we
need to first find out the reasons for the unsatisfactory sim-
ulation results.
B. Data characteristics
Comparing the data recorded from different sessions,
we discovered big variations in most of the individual sub-
jects’ hand-grip pattern images. That is, for a certain sub-
ject, his hand-grip pattern varied greatly on average from
one session to another.
Two main factors may contribute to the across-session
variations of the same subject. One is the intrinsic fac-
tor. That is, for some biological reason, after a certain
amount of time, a person’s hand-grip pattern tends to
change within some certain range. The other one is the
extrinsic factor. Since the data acquisition conditions in
these three sessions were slightly different, this may also
cause the variations of across-session data. Specifically,
in the third session we used a beep, while not in the other
two sessions. As mentioned in Section 2, this may affect
the recording time, and consequently the grip pattern im-
age. Also, two different experimenters were recording data
by pressing a button on the laptop, in the first and the sec-
ond session, respectively. This may also result in differ-
ent recording times of images, from even the same sub-
ject. Because it is very likely, that these two experimenters
need different amounts of time, to respond to the subject’s
“ready” signal, or to press the button.
To find out statistically, how a certain subject’s data
varies from one session to another, we did an experiment
as follows. We first randomly split the test set into two
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Fig. 4. Hand-grip pattern images of the same subject recorded
in two different sessions
equal-sized subsets, namely subset A and subset B; and
then used, for example, subset A for testing. Among those
four parameters to estimate in the algorithm, we estimated
three of them from the training set, yet the fourth one from
subset B. We averaged the overall EERs obtained from 50
runs of this type of simulation as the final result. This gives
an insight on how much the across-session variation in a
certain parameter, affects the authentication performance.
For example, we may plug in the mean vector of overall
subjects, estimated from the test set B; while use the other
three parameters, estimated from the training set.
Table III gives the simulation results. TrSe and TeSe
represent the training session and testing session, respec-
tively; LM and LC represent the mean vector and the co-
variance matrix of each individual subject’s data, respec-
tively; GM represents the mean vector of the overall data;
and TM represents the transformation matrix. To make
comparison easier, the across-session simulation results
are shown in the third row, represented by RF.
TrSe 1 2 1 3 2 3
TeSe 2 1 3 1 3 2
RF 8.78 7.02 23.18 15.82 19.36 19.09
LM 2.95 1.53 2.70 2.95 3.10 3.36
LC 9.09 7.66 23.63 15.56 20.85 18.18
GM 8.89 6.99 23.27 15.79 19.66 19.36
TM 5.46 4.92 14.30 22.20 16.66 19.16
TABLE III
SIMULATION RESULTS IN EER(%) WITH ONE PARAMETER
ESTIMATED FROM SUBSET B
Obviously, the across-session variation in the mean
value of each individual subject’s data, affects the authen-
tication performance the most. When this type of varia-
tion is reduced, the authentication performance will be im-
proved dramatically. Fig.5 gives further information about
the changes, of the FRR and the FAR, in this type of sim-
ulation. Still, we take the first and the second session for
training and testing, respectively.
Specifically, for most of the subjects, the pressure of
their hand-grip patterns is distributed differently in differ-
ent sessions (see Fig.4 for an example). Besides, for some
subjects, shifts in position of their hands in different ses-
sions have been observed.
Fig. 5. FAR and FRR curves obtained from the across-session
simulation and the LM-plug-in simulation
C. Algorithm limitations
The reference likelihood-ratio classifier is probability-
density-based, which thus requires estimating the density
function (Gaussian density function in our case) from the
training data, before classification. In our case it suffers
from the small-sample-size problem, since the available
training set is relatively small, in comparison with the di-
mension of the original feature space. We therefore ap-
plied PCA twice to reduce the dimension of the feature
space. However, this strategy may not suppress the small-
sample-size problem well enough. Recently it has been
proposed, that the small-sample-size problem and conse-
quently the danger of overtraining, result from the high
complexity of the classifier. In addition, the dimension
of the feature space by itself, is not a good measure of a
classifier’s complexity [5]. Thus, even in the space with
a lower dimension, the likelihood-ratio classifier may still
suffer from overtraining, and thus not have good general-
ization performance.
Another limitation of the reference classifier is the as-
sumption of Gaussian distributed data. The use of PCA,
implicitly assumes that the data has Gaussian probability
distribution. Also, the likelihood-ratio classifier is optimal
in terms of the expected overall error rates, only when the
probability density function of the data is known. Thus, if
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this assumption is violated, the reference classifier is sub-
optimal.
D. Possible Strategies to Improve the Performance
To improve the authentication performance of the sys-
tem, we may first consider reducing the across-session
variation in each individual subject’s mean value. Conse-
quently, we believe, the variations in the other three param-
eters will be further reduced as well. Some preprocessing
of the grip pattern images may help to achieve that. For
example, in a hand-grip pattern image, we may try equal-
izing the local pressure values. This may help to reduce the
difference in pressure distribution between two images, of
the same subject. Also, registration may help to align those
grip patterns, which suffer from shifts in different sessions.
In addition, a method useful for face recognition, Elastic
Bunch Graph Matching, may be worth trying. It proves
especially efficient in coping with variations in the face
position, size, pose, and expression [6]. These variations
are, at least to some extent, similar to the across-session
variations of the same subject in our problem. Thus, this
method may bring some improvement in the authentication
performance of our system.
Also, we may turn to some other type of classifier. Tak-
ing into account the limitations of the reference classifier,
the Support Vector Machine (SVM) seems a promising
choice. The SVM builds an optimal classifier, and mean-
while controls its complexity to gain the generalization
power. Further more, the SVM does not rely on any as-
sumption specifically about data’s characteristics [5]. Be-
sides, in some preliminary simulation results with the grip
pattern data, the SVM has been proved to be more robust
to overtraining, compared to the reference classifier.
Certainly, these two solutions could be combined. Any
proper preprocessing methods would also be helpful to a
new type of classifier. Besides, it is very likely, that no
classifier could solve the overtraining problem in question
by itself, even if it has good generalization performance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This smart gun system has been proved to be useful for
authentication, with hand-grip pattern data collected from
the police officers. This certainly ensures its potential to
be used by the police in the future. However, its authenti-
cation performance needs to be further improved to meet
the safety requirement of a real police gun.
Simulation results of authentication experiment have
been analyzed, in terms of both the data characteristics,
and the algorithm limitations. We discovered a big varia-
tion in the mean value of each individual subject’s data, in
different sessions. This type of variation is the main reason
for the unsatisfied performance of the current algorithm.
Accordingly, we may apply some proper preprocessing
methods to reduce this variation. Also, improvements may
be expected, by using some other classifier, especially one
with better generalization performance. SVM, for exam-
ple, may be a good choice.
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